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Abstract 
The Principles of Fundamental Justice ascribed under section 7 of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms are a commonly misunderstood and an ambiguous area of Canadian law. Within the 
Canadian context, the Supreme Court’s interpretations of these principles give them incredible 
weight and significance, while giving little definition or explanation. Drawing on case law from 
the Supreme Court of Canada, this thesis examines the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
substantive principles of fundamental justice for the purpose of evaluating their importance and 
use within Canadian law. The Court is reluctant to provide precise definitions of these principles 
for the purpose of increased interpretive power in the future. Due to the Charter’s relatively 
young age and the emergence of significant topics under section 7, the Court denies furthering 
what the principals of fundamental justice are in order to better protect the right to life, liberty 
and security of person in the future.  
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A Historical Analysis of the Substantive Principles of Fundamental Justice under 
Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
In this thesis, the Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretations of the substantive principles 
of fundamental justice will be examined. It is suggested that the substantive principles of 
fundamental justice ascribed under Section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms do not offer 
strong definitions of their own abilities and their current use remains open for interpretation from 
the Courts. The Supreme Court of Canada offers limited definitions surrounding these ominous 
and important principles within the legal system. The central conclusion found within the 
examination is that the Courts have found more benefit in not providing clear definitions, 
expectations and methods for these principles as it increased the Court’s future ability to use 
them in more ways. The young nature of the Charter presents limitations on the Court, as many 
issues have not been heard regarding the right to life, liberty and security of person. By 
refraining from providing strict definitions, the Court gives themselves an increased ability to 
openly develop section 7.  
The primary aim of this historical analysis is to create a more comprehensive 
understanding of the current definition of each substantive principle of fundamental justice 
through the examination of Supreme Court decisions. Through examination of the principles of 
vagueness, overbreadth, arbitrariness, moral blameworthiness and gross disproportionality, the 
Court’s power of judicial review is examined while compiling the currently available 
interpretations. Principles of fundamental justice are defined by the Courts to be the basic tenets 
of the legal system offering a secondary standard for section 7 infringements. This ability is 
examined through what information the Courts have chosen to present regarding the principles. 
The principles of fundamental justice are the systematic evaluation for “bad laws.” This is an 
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integral part of protecting individuals right to life, liberty and security of person, that is within an 
already misunderstood area of law. The Charter is commonly misunderstood by the individuals it 
is meant to offer protection to. This evaluation assists in developing understanding of the 
Charter, section 7 and the use of the principles of fundamental justice to better develop 
legislation.  
I. Methodology 
The purpose of this examination is to provide a furthered understanding of the 
substantive principles of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. This examination takes a historical analysis design for the purpose of providing 
synthesized information regarding the substantive principles of fundamental justice. A historical 
analysis is a type of study that collects previous research to create new understandings of a topic 
(University of Southern California, 2019). The use of collection, verification and summary of 
secondary sources of data assist in the development of this type of study. The benefits found 
through historical analyses include the unobtrusive nature of the data, the presentation of trends, 
and important historical context for societies. This method was chosen for these benefits and 
direct relation to the type of data available. Case law and Supreme Court interpretations are 
considered official records / reports / and archives, which best fit a historical approach 
(University of Southern California, 2019). Through the use of the historical design, a trend in 
interpretation from the Supreme Court can be identified and better understood. The collection of 
precedent cases that have had significant impact on the definitions of these principles creates 
increased understanding on the principles use and purpose within the Canadian legal system.  
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This thesis uses case law as the primary source of data while consulting scholarly authors 
that have written significant works on Supreme Court decisions. This study does not have direct 
implications on the findings due to the historical approach. Each principle is evaluated through 
the analysis of case law, which directly impacts the definition and understanding of that 
individual principle. The principles are first defined then evaluated through case law. Each 
principle offers three or four cases that present furthered understanding or meaning for the 
principle. Trends between each of the principles to create overarching understandings are 
analyzed through how the definition was created and its impacts on society.  
II. Section 7 of the Charter 
Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides the following right:  
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice 
(Constitution Act, 1982).  
 
Principles of Fundamental Justice were included as an imbedded secondary standard 
when concluding section 7 violations. These principles were left undefined for the purpose of 
continuous interpretation and flexibility. Due to the lack of specific definition, these principles 
are commonly misunderstood by some and are open to many different interpretations.  
III. Principles of Fundamental Justice 
When an individual claims that state action has infringed on section 7, the state’s actions 
must comply with the principles of fundamental justice in order to save the policy, law or 
legislative action. If the state’s action complies within the principles, then it can be saved under 
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section 1 of the Charter. If it does not comply, the individual has proven a section 7 violation 
(Stewart, 2012, pg. 97). These principles act as regulations for policy’s to ensure that individuals 
and processes are protected, and that legislative intent is properly established. These principles 
are the second half in a two-step process to examine an infringement on section 7. The first half 
is the analysis by the Courts to establish if a section 7 violation exists; this looks at the 
legislations impact on the individual’s “life, liberty and security of person”. (Evans, 1991).  If a 
section 7 infringement is found, the second half of the test is initiated.  
The second test determines if the impugned law is contrary to any of the principles of 
fundamental justice. Due to the constant evolving nature of these principles, the evaluation is not 
limited to procedural justice, but can encompass substance issues or fault issues (Evans, 1991).  
A central component of these principles, as recognized by Justice Lamer in Re BC Motor Vehicle 
Act1, is the inability of these principles to be free standing in nature (Sharpe & Roach, 2017). 
This understanding furthered the interpretation of these principles to only apply to law once a 
section 7 violation has been evoked (Sharpe & Roach, 2017). The reason for not including these 
as a free standing principle was to properly define them as part of the “basic tenets of our legal 
system” and “the specter of a judicial super-legislature” as opposed to general aspects of law, 
keeping the standard of importance with these principles, as said by Justice Lamer (Sharpe & 
Roach, 2017).   
To establish a principle of fundamental justice, a three-part test was formed to ensure 
each principle remained within the realm of fundamental law and the tenets of the legal system. 
                                                
1	Re BC Motor Vehicle Act [1985] 2 SCR 486	
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This three-part test includes that each principle must be (1) a legal principle, (2) supported by a 
social consensus and (3) yield a manageable standard (Sharpe & Roach, 2017). Principles of 
fundamental justice intend on setting out the standard for the least amount that law can 
negatively impact an individual before it violates their life, liberty and security of person.  
There are several definitions offered by the Courts as to what a principles of fundamental 
justice is, Justice Lamer J. defined them as: “[t]he term ‘principles of fundamental justice’ is not 
a right, but a qualifier of the right not to be deprived of life, liberty and security of the person; its 
function is to set the parameters of that right” (Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 
(“Motor Vehicle Reference”), at p. 512). As seen above, Lamer also offered the definition of 
“basic tenets of the legal system.” Not only are there multiple definitions of these principles, but 
they have also been applied inconsistently. The lower courts have presented confusion regarding 
the principles of arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality as they overlap in 
definition and use in several cases. The Supreme Court noted this confusion and even furthered 
the discussion regarding the combobulated natured of overbreadth and grossly disproportionate 
(R. v. Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 555).  Although there is significant overlap, the 
Court has stayed firm on ensuring they are each individual and important tenets of the legal 
system. The first principles included under section 7 were moral blameworthiness and mens rea 
in 1985. Principles have been included from 1985 until 2005, with new definitions being 
included until 2015. The current principles are divided into three categories: fault, procedural 
and substantive. Below is a comprehensive chart of the current principles of fundamental justice:  
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Fault Principles 
Mens Rea 
Doli Incapax 
 
 
Procedural Principles 
Presumption of Innocence 
Right of Silence 
Right to Full Answer & Defense 
Right to Full Disclosure 
Best Evidence Rule 
 
 
Substantive Principles 
Vagueness 
Overbreadth 
Arbitariness 
Moral Blameworthiness 
Gross Disproportionality 
 
Figure 1: Comprehensive Principles of Fundamental Justice.  
 For the purpose of this paper, only the substantive principles will be examined. These 
principles where chosen due to their significant impact on individual protection from injustice 
laws. Substantive principles target just that, the substantive elements of laws challenged under 
section 7. Laws are developed to have both a procedural (procedures or methods to follow) and 
substantive (rights and duties to be followed) element entwined into them (Cornel Law School, 
2019). Substantive principles seek to ensure the substantive elements of laws are just and offer 
fair protection of life, liberty and security of person.  
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Substantive Principles of Fundamental Justice  
  Substantive principles of fundamental justice are a subsection of principles under section 
7 that include: vagueness, overbreadth, arbitrariness, moral blameworthiness and gross 
disproportionality. There principles are considered to be most concerned with protecting 
individuals from unjust laws, creating an increased importance for these principles to be 
examined. Substantive principles are most often engaged in legal questions of statutes, 
regulations, and common law rulings but also apply to formal and social norm procedures of 
legal disputes (Stewart, 2012).  
Re. Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) established that not all principles of 
fundamental justice are concerned with strictly procedural issues, but also address substantive 
issues (Hogg, 2012, pg. 198). This decision from the Court was controversial due to the Minister 
of Justice and other officials, who had drafted section 7, testifying in front of the Special Joint 
Committee and the Senate and House of Commons expressing that the intention of principles of 
fundamental justice was to be procedural (Hogg, 2012, pg. 198). The concern with introducing 
substantive elements arose from the US term “substantive due process” and their desire to 
separate “fundamental justice” from “due process.”  
In his decision, Justice Lamer interpreted the principles of fundamental justice to not 
have a settled interpretation and therefore could include substantive elements (Hogg, 2012, pg. 
199). The Court agreed that the inclusion of substantive elements better suited section 7’s 
intentions and could more strongly protect individual life, liberty and security of person. Hogg 
(2012) states that the original intention of the legislation does not support substantive principles 
being included, but “…for those of us who are not originalists”, the inclusion of these rights 
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expand and support judicial review under section 7, bettering the Court’s ability to protect 
individual liberties (Hogg, 2012, pg. 199).  
Below is a historical analysis of each of the substantive principles of fundamental justice. 
Each section provides an overview of the principle, its history of enumeration, and case law 
examples of the Court’s use and definition in attempt to provide a semi-comprehensive 
understanding of each principle. The term semi-comprehensive is used as each principle is 
complex and is open to further definition by the Court, so a completely comprehensive analysis 
is unlikely to exist in the near future. Each section seeks to provide the most important and 
relevant information surrounding the current definition of the principle. 
IV. Vagueness 
The principle of vagueness states that laws must not be overly vague in order to provide 
sufficient guidance for legal discussion and debate (Stewart, 2012). Vagueness was recognized 
within the principles of fundamental justice in 1992 in the R v Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical 
Society2 decision.  
The principle of vagueness states that policies and law must be specific and precise in the 
wording as to give fair notice to those affected under the law or policy. The language used within 
each policy must be precise enough that a fair defense is not denied or impeded. This principle is 
further defined by Stewart (2012) to include that laws must be precise enough to give sufficient 
guidance for legal debate. However, this principle does not require laws to be absolute, as ruled 
in R v Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society (1992), as laws could never be certain in every 
                                                
2 R v Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society [1992] 2 SCR 606  
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aspect. The Supreme Court of Canada confirmed vagueness as a principle of fundamental justice 
within the Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society decision as Justice Gonthier stated that section 7 
could not be offended if the law was so “devoid of precision in its content that a conviction 
[would] automatically follow.” (R v Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, 1992).  
 Being constitutionally accepted as not being vague is defined as language that bares 
enough information to relate to human knowledge and understanding of the operations of the 
legal system with the ability to to give sufficient guidance for legal debate (R v Nova Scotia 
Pharmaceutical Society, 1992). This acknowledgment opens up an acceptable risk for those 
effected under the law by creating an “acceptable” and “not-acceptable” area within each law 
that is clearly understood within the general public as well as creating a substantive guidance for 
notice. Fair notice to citizens encompasses two formal aspects: the text of the policy or law and 
the substantive understanding that a specific context is the subject of legal restrictions (R v Nova 
Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, 1992). The definition of vagueness when applied to law tries to 
achieved the goal of delineating the area of risk – if a policy has succeeded in defining what 
would create risk for the individual effected by it, then it is not considered unconstitutionally 
vague.  
The doctrine of vagueness is defined by five central theoretical aspects: fair notice to 
citizens, limitation of law enforcement discretion, European Court of Human Rights Case law, 
the scope of precision, and the rule of law. These five areas assist in developing a fuller 
understanding of how vagueness should be interpreted and create a threshold for finding a law 
vague.  Due to the expansive nature of these definitions, they will not be covered in this 
evaluation.  
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R v Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society [1992] 2 SCR 606  
The Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC) decisions in R v Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical 
Society [1992]3 is the leading interpretation of the principle of vagueness in Canadian context. 
The issue of law that arose throughout the appeal was whether the term “unduly” within section 
32(1) of the Combines Investigation Act infringes on section 7 of the Charter, engaging the 
doctrine of vagueness. The Court’s interpretation of this principle created the definition provided 
above, for the purpose of ruling on whether the twelve accused were guilty of conspiracy to 
prevent or lessen competition unduly. The appeal was dismissed. The issue of vagueness was 
addressed due to the term “unduly” within section 32(1). The Court found that fair notice to 
citizens within substantive elements of law enforcement and discretion was essential to the 
individual’s constitutional rights, requiring that laws not be so lacking in specific content that a 
conviction would automatically follow. The Court recognize that the central competent to 
vagueness is the need to leave room for legal debate. This is further defined to state that “legal 
debate” is considered to be within the “limits of human knowledge and understanding in the 
operation of the law” (R v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, 1992). If a law were to leave no 
room for legal debate, it would contradict the rule of law. The Court reason for including 
vagueness to the principles of fundamental justice was to ensure that when a section 7 violation 
occurs, the laws are specific enough in wording to allow the individual a proper legal debate and 
awareness of what the law is entailing.  
                                                
3 See Note 2 
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R v Morals [1992] 3 SCR 711 
The issue of law being discussed in the R v Morals4 decision is the issue of being denied 
judicial interim release based on the grounds that the individuals detention is essential to the 
protection and safety of the public under section 515(1)(b) of the Criminal Code of Canada 
(CCC). The appellant argued that this provision violated his section 11(e)5 right. The Court 
examined this infringement using vagueness under section 7 to determine if section 515(1)(b) 
was threating section 11(e). The Court found that the phrasing of this standard did not leave 
room for legal debate and was a “standardless sweep, as the Courts can order imprisonment 
whenever it sees fit” (Stewart, 2012, pg. 131). The use of vagueness in this decision resulted in 
changing the provisions for denying judicial interim release to include three grounds for denial, 
as opposed to the previous two, while removing the previous second step. The revised section 
515 was challenged for being constitutionally vague, but this was denied as the Court stated that 
leaving room for the Court’s interpretation did not mean it was vague or did not allow for legal 
debate (Stewart, 2012, pg. 131). The use of vagueness in this decision created a new 
understanding of the principle, as it further defined the principle’s ability to be used outside of 
section 7 challenges as well as created the understanding that laws do not have to be absolute, 
but instead need to fit within the rule of law.  
 
 
                                                
4 R v Morlas [1992] 3 SCR 711  
5 Section 11(e) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms states that everyone has the right not to be denied 
reasonable bail without just cause.		
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O’Neill v Canada (Attorney General) [2006] 213 CCC (3d) 389 (Ont SCJ) [O’Neill] 
The issue of law being discussed in O’Neill v Canada (AG) [2006]6 is the provisions 
under the Security of Information Act that allowed RCMP officers to obtain and exercise 
warrants to search a reporters home were unconstitutionally vague. The Act did not define the 
difference between “secret official” and “official” information. This was argued to be vague 
under section 7 of the Charter as the risk areas were not properly defined between acceptable and 
non acceptable and could not be interpreted sufficiently to make a defense or set an expectation 
for the individual (Stewart, 2012, pg. 132). This is an important area of case law for the principle 
of vagueness as it is one of the few cases that was ruled to be vague under section 7. The 
standard for vagueness is very high and often results in a rejection. This principle is important to 
recognize as it addresses when laws do not fall under the rule of law and offend the individual’s 
ability to present a defense in court. Laws do not need to be overly precise as to hinder the legal 
debate, but should be able to inspire law debate around the actions and law. The lower majority 
of cases that engaged vagueness do not get ruled as unconstitutionally vague due to the laws 
ability to spark legal debate.    
V. Overbreadth 
 The principles of Overbreadth states that legislation must not be overly broad in its 
relation to its intended purpose (Stewart, 2012, pg. 133). The principle was defined and include 
into the principles of fundamental justice in R. v. Heywood7 
                                                
6 O’Neill v Canada (AG) [2006] 213 CCC (3d) 389 (Ont SCJ) [O’Neill] 
 
7 R. v. Heywood [1994] 3 SCR 761 
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 Overbreadth dictates that legislation cannot have a broader impact then its initial 
intention or have extended negative implications for the person effected by the law. The purpose 
of including this principle under section 7 is to ensure that laws are created with specific purpose 
and precision in their ntentions. This principle was recognized in 1994 in the Heywood decision. 
Written by Justice Lamer, overbreadth is discussed as a similar, but separate, principle from 
vagueness – vagueness considers laws that are not precious enough, whereas overbreadth 
considers laws that entail too much in relation to the intention of the law. These principles 
overlap in their related concerns with legislation being accurate, however, there execution and 
scope are different (R v Heywood, 1994). A key factor that separates vagueness and overbreadth 
is the Court’s ability to find a law unfit even if it is rational in come aspects (Roach & Sharpe, 
2017, pg. 265).  
In the case of R. v Heywood8, the law preventing sexual offenders from loitering in a 
public park is rational, if those offenders have been charged with an offence relating to children. 
However, the law is considered to be overbroad, as the law applies to all sexual offenders, even 
if children where not involved. Overbreadth is discussed by Justice Lamer to specify that the 
analysis includes the means the state used to meet its objectives and what the intended purpose of 
the legislation is. If the legislation’s purpose is legitimate, the means of reaching the purpose 
must be within a reasonable scope as to not be overly broad and encompass reasonable 
limitations on the individual. The Court stated that in deciding if a law is overly broad, it must 
have an effect that in some instances is inappropriate and/or disproportionation. To decide if 
overbreadth should be included within the principles of fundamental justice, the Court concluded 
                                                
8 See note 6.  
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that the principle was a means of balancing state interest against that of the individual – if the 
states interests are not properly conveyed through the legislation, then it violates the principles of 
fundamental justice (R v. Heywood, 1994). 
 The principles of overbreadth can also be compared to minimal impairment under the 
Oakes Test9 as both attempt to establish if the objective of the law is fitting to the action taken to 
reach it. The differentiating factor between these two legal concepts is overbreadth’s intentional 
focus on section 7 violations. The minimal impairment pronged within the Oakes Test seeks the 
best option for social impact as a greater, more general, whole (Roach & Sharpe, 2017, pg. 265).  
Overbreadth is further defined within the discussion of R v Heywood. 
R. v. Heywood [1994] 3 SCR 761 
The Heywood decision is the precedent case for the principle of overbreadth, as it was 
introduced into the principles of fundamental justice within this decision. The accused was 
charged under section 179(1)(b)10 of the Criminal Code of Canada. Previously, the accused had 
been convicted of two counts of sexual assault, a year following this conviction, the accused was 
found in a public park with a camera. Police informed him of the provisions under section 179, 
and asked him to leave the area. The accused complied. One month later, the accused was again 
found in a public park with a camera. At this point the accused was arrested and charged under 
section 179. In detention, the accused was searched and he was found to have photographs of 
                                                
9 The Oakes Test was established in R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103, that comprised the section 1 guarantee 
test into three recognizable steps to determine if an infringement is justified. One of these three steps is 
minimal impairment that states that legislation must take the option that impairs the individual’s rights the 
least amount possible while still meeting the objective of the law.  
10 Section 719(1)(b) of the Criminal Code of Canada states that if an individual has been previously 
convicted of a sexual offence and is loitering near a play ground, park, school grounds or public bathing 
area they have committed a vagrancy (Criminal Code of Canada, 2018).			
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clothed genital areas of young girls. The accused argued that section 179 was unconstitutionally 
overbroad to reach its intention.  
Heywood was successful and section 179 was found to be overbroad. The Court’s 
reasoning for the law being overbroad was the lack of definition regarding loitering – the Court 
stated that the correct definition for this provision would be to “ideally stand, hang around, 
linger…” (R v Heywood, 1994) – which would prevent any person charged of sexual assault 
from entering parks, playground and schools, which also were not precise enough and would 
entail wilderness parks as well. This overbroad definition would mean that any person with a 
sexual assault conviction could not enter a park at any point during their life time. The other 
issue found within section 179 was the lack ability for the person to be informed of the violation, 
as section 179 was not disclosed at the time of being convicted. The section also applies to all 
sexual offenders, not only those charged with sexual offences relating to children. The Court 
stated that the section’s purpose is to mitigate risk of children being victimized by sexual 
offenders, but it is overly broad in its actions. Due to the section’s disproportionate effects, it 
violated section 7, the principle of overbreadth, and it does not pass the minimal impairment 
portion of the Oakes Test (Stewart, 2012, 135). This leading case brought overbreadth into the 
principles of fundamental justice in order to more simply address laws that do not directly meet 
the original intention.  
R v Demers [2004] 2 SCR 489, 2004 SCC 46  
 The issue of law being determined in this case was the accused ability to stand trial due to 
a moderate intellectual handicap. The accused was charged with a sexual assault offence, 
admitted into a hospital and remained at the hospital until his discharge, with conditions. Three 
months later the Review Board, granted authority under section 672.47 and 672.54 of the 
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Criminal Code, acknowledged that the accused was unfit to stand trail until his circumstances 
change and he is able to stand trial or the Crown is unable to establish a prima facie case (R v 
Demers, 2004). Overbreadth was engaged due to the review boards inability to fully release the 
accused due to the provisions wording that he was “permanently” unable to stand trial. The 
review board’s lacked evidence that the accused would be of danger to the public, which is 
included within section 672.54 of the Criminal Code. The SCC found that the review board’s 
inability to release the individual put a permanent restriction on the individual’s right to life, 
liberty and security of person and was overly broad in its means of reaching its objective (R v 
Demers, 2004).  
The Court found that by not providing a reason other than the anticipated lack of 
improvement to the individual’s handicap, the law was reaching far past its original intention and 
was unconstitutionally to broad. This cases use of overbreadth furthered the definition of the 
principle to include successfully finding a law to be overly broad, as the standard for reaching 
overbreadth is high, and that lack of definition and ability for interpretation can result in the law 
being overly broad (Stewart, 2012, pg. 135). R v Demers (2004) demonstrates this through the 
board’s inability to have discretion within a Criminal Code section and therefore the law 
becomes inappropriate for this circumstance.  
R v Clay [2003] 3 SCR 735  
 The issue of law being discussed in R v Clay11 is the illegal possession and selling of 
marijuana. The defendant owned a store located in Ontario where he sold hemp and hemp-
related products as well as marijuana seedlings. An undercover officer purchased a small amount 
                                                
11 R v Clay [2003] 3 SCR 735  
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of the drug from the store leading to charged being laid under the Narcotic Control Act (R v 
Clay, 2003). The defendant argued that the illegal nature of possession of marijuana infringed on 
his section 7 right to life, liberty and security of person. This argument was rejected by the trial 
court and the subsequent appeal was dismissed on the grounds that section 7 protects the central 
elements of dignity and independence within human nature that are fundamental to human rights 
and personal autonomously, and the recreation use of marijuana did not meet this standard.  
The accused brought forward the issue of overbreadth to the Supreme Court, to suggest 
the law overly broad in scope. The Court found that the objective of the law, to avoid harm to 
users and other using marijuana, was met sufficiently by the means of the legislation that 
prohibited individuals from trafficking and selling the drug. This judgement became significant 
due to the Court’s additional definition of the principles that states the law must not be “grossly 
disproportionate to the state interest in avoiding harm...” (R v Clay, 2003). The use of “grossly 
disproportionate” created a dual standard for finding a law to be overly broad – mere overbreadth 
and grossly disproportionate overbreadth. Mere overbreadth is the violation of section 7 when 
the means of reaching the objective encompass too many aspects and can become 
disproportionate with limited impact on the individual actions (Stewart, 2012, pg. 135). Within 
the Heywood and Demers decision, the Court suggested that mere overbreadth was all that had to 
be established in order to confirm a section 7 violation. However, the Court’s use of grossly 
disproportionate within Clay created a new threshold. If the Court ruled that the law was grossly 
disproportionate, as opposed to mere overbreadth, the revision of the law must take into account 
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the increased nature of the overbreadth.12 The principle of gross disproportionality will be 
addressed in more detail as a distinct principle of fundamental justice further in this thesis.  
VI. Arbitrariness 
A principle of fundamental justice is that a law must not be arbitrary, meaning that a law 
that bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with its original intention, is considered arbitrary 
(Stewart, 2012). A condensed understanding of this definition is that a law is arbitrary if it is not 
needed to meet the intention of the law or it does not provide positive effect in the means of 
meeting the intention (Stewart, 2012).  
The Supreme Courts has not created a ‘test’ or clear definition for what is considered to 
be an arbitrary violation of section 7, but have evoked what would be considered ‘arbitrariness’ 
in several leading cases. Courts have commonly regarded the principle of arbitrariness to be the 
same as the principle of grossly disproportionate, but remain that they should be separate 
principles. This separation is seen in decisions such as Chaoulli v Quebec13, the leading decision 
for the inclusion of arbitrariness due to the Court’s decision to strike down the law only on the 
ground of arbitrariness. Stewart (2012) identifies the principle of arbitrariness to be a check on 
legislation when the initial intention was acceptable, but the means are irrational and unsuitable. 
The Court is carful in their use of this principle due to the nature of the principle’s definition – 
the original intention of the law is met by an irrational means of meeting it; which can be 
considered harmful in the Court’s dialogue with Parliament (Stewart, 2012).  
                                                
12Overbreadth is also engaged in Bedford v Canada (see note 30) and Carter v Canada (see note 31) 
13 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 
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There is no case in which the Court clearly invoke the principle of arbitrariness, but it can 
be most directly seen in R v Morgentaler14 and Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney General)15. In 
Morgentaler16 the requirement of the law that all abortions must go through a therapeutic 
abortion committee in an accredited hospital was challenged due to its arbitrary nature. The 
purpose of this law was to ensure women’s health was upheld, but the means of achieving this 
caused or had the potential to cause significant delirious effects to women’s health. Within 
Morgentaler, Justice Beetz J. referred to this as “manifest unfairness” which was later interpreted 
to be ‘arbitrariness” (Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013). The Courts have been careful 
in their approach to arbitrary decisions to ensure detailed and careful consideration of the laws 
original intention and the instrumentation of reaching this intention (Steward, 2012). The Court 
specifically acknowledge that arbitrariness must be considered when evaluating, as stated by 
McLachlin CJC, “…the issues in the light, not just of common sense or theory, but of evidence” 
(McLachlin as cited in Stewart, 2012, pg. 147).  
There have been two types of approaches to arbitrariness taken by the Court. First, as 
stated by McLachlin CJC, the approach of recognizing the evidence and issues within the 
individual case. Second, the Court’s ‘demanding’ approach, which is seen within Chaoulli, 
which Stewart (2012) interprets as the prevailing approach. This approach is controversial, direct 
and impactful on Parliament’s legislative abilities.  
Sharpe & Roach (2017) identify that, although there is not a clear test to identify 
legislation as arbitrary, there are several consistent ‘tests’ from various justices. Within Chaoulli 
                                                
 
14 R v Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 30	
15	Above note 11	
16	Above Note 14	
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(2005), three dissenting Justices stated that arbitrariness could only be found if the legislation 
bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with its objective.  In contrast, the majority found that the 
test for arbitrary on the grounds of being situated under section 7 must satisfy the larger 
requirement of “necessary” for the state’s objective. Within Bedford, the Court also identified 
that this ‘test’ must include a rational connection between the measures taken to reach the 
interests of the law, without depriving the right to life, liberty and security of person. This 
continues to stress that if an imposition exists within this realm that bears no connection to the 
original objective it is considered arbitrary. The 2015 Carter decision added to this ‘test’ to 
include that the test for arbitrary must include an examination of whether the law is capable of 
fulfilling its’ objective. There is no exact compellation of what is considered arbitrary, however 
the Court has continued to build this ‘test’ without restricting its ability to continue its defining 
abilities.  
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 
 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General) (2005)17 regards the legal issue of Quebec citizens 
gaining access to private health care sources and for these services to be covered under 
provincial health care. The appellant, Z, had experienced several health problems that were 
subject to long wait periods while their physician, C, was seeking to get provincial approval to 
have a home-delivered medical services recognized and be licensed to work as a private health 
provider. The provincial statues, s. 15 of the Health Insurance Act (HEIA) and s. 11 of the 
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Hospital Insurance Act (HOIA), deprives the appellants from accessing private health insurance 
in order to avoid lengthy wait times and creating private practices.  
The validity of the HEIA and HOIA were contested, stating that they violate both section 
1 of the Quebec Charter and section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The 
Supreme Court of Canada held that the appeal should be allowed due to the law’s engagement of 
the elements of the right to life and security of person. This infringement violates the principle of 
arbitrariness, as the intention of the law to prohibit private health care in order to maintain a 
quality public heath care system is arbitrary as there is no evidence that private heath care 
demises the quality of public care institutions.  
The legislation also did not pass the Oakes Test18 when evaluating the legislations 
original intention and effects. The Court determined that the objective of protecting the health 
care system is not rationally connected to prohibiting private heath care. The infringement on 
individuals right to life liberty and security of person are not minimally impairing in attempting 
to protect the health care system and the benefits seen from the legislation did not out weight the 
deleterious effects of creating unreasonably long wait times for serious health care needs 
(Chaoulli v Quebec, 2005, para. 13).  The majority found that the law was arbitrary due to the 
lack of connection between the objective and the laws impact.  
The Court’s interpretation of arbitrary within Chaoulli19 is the leading precedent use of 
the principle, for the increased use and understanding of the Court’s definition of it, but also for 
its separation from grossly disproportionality. The Court could have used both principles to 
                                                
18 See note 8  
19See note 11  
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF PRINCIPLES OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE 27	
declare the violation of section 7, but chose not to. This creates an understanding that the two 
principles are separate entitles.  
R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30  
The issue of law in R v Morgentaler20 was the validity of section 423(1) and 251(1) of the 
Criminal Code of Canada. This statute required women seeking abortions to have approval from 
the therapeutic abortion committee and obtain the procedure from an accredited hospital. The 
appellant argued a violation of sections 2,(a), 7 and 12 of the Charter. The Court found that the 
restriction on women to be put forth in front of a committee and to have a specific type of 
hospital with a certain criteria of staff working there was arbitrary and unfair. The Court states 
that the length of travel some women would need to endure for the procedure was systematically 
unfair, as smaller rural hospitals could never reasonably meet the criteria to be “accredited.” Due 
to these issues, section 423(a) and 251(1) violated section 7 and could not be saved under section 
1. The engagement of section 7 comes from the legislation’s unnecessary delay of access. 
Parliament is justified in systematically protecting the interest of the fetus, however, the 
provisions under section 251 violate section 7 as well as the principles of fundamental justice. 
The Court states that the original intention of the law was valid in seeking to protect the fetus, 
but the means of reaching this objective were unfair and could contributed to additional health 
risk to the pregnant women.  
An additional issue of law discussed in Morgentaler is that of the fetus’s interests vs. the 
woman carrying the fetus. Parliament’s original intention was to protect the interest of the fetus, 
while the section 7 violation is in the interest of the women carrying it. The Court ruled that the 
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women carrying the fetus would have increased severity in ensuring her right to life, liberty and 
security of person, stating it was unnecessary to discuss the rights of the fetus at early stages of 
development. The Court did pose the obiter that future cases involving later stages of 
development within the fetus could result in a change of proportionality.  
The issue of law was resolved within the application of the Oakes Test. The Court stated 
that the means of protecting the fetus through accredited hospitals and review committees was 
not rationally connected. Further, the women’s interests were higher in proportionality than the 
fetus’s and the benefits of protecting fetus’s did not outweigh the physical and emotional harm 
resulting from the provision of section 251 onto the pregnant women.  
The Court explicitly uses the term “arbitrary” within it’s judgment to describe the 
legislation’s impact on society and its discussion of a violation of the principles of fundamental 
justice. The Court applied the definition of arbitrary in describing the judgment. This careful use 
to indirectly implement the principle furthers the understanding that the Court is reluctant to use 
the principle and are aware of the possible negative effects it may have within Parliament.  
R v Malmo-Levine; R v Caine, 2003 SCC 74 
The issue of law being discussed in R v Malmo-Levine21 is that of the jurisdictional 
components of the former Narcotics Control Act as well as the inclusion of the judicial option for 
imprisonment for simple possession of drugs, specifically, marijuana. Appellant, C, was 
approached by two RCMP officers while in his parked car. As the officer approached, a strong 
smell of marijuana surrounded the car. C forfeited a partially smoked ‘joint’ that contained 
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marijuana.  He was charged under section 3(1) of the Narcotics Control Act that prohibited any 
form of possession of narcotics. The two options available to the court under this section was: 
upon first offence, a maximum fine of $1000.00 or imprisonment for up to six months, or both; 
upon subsequent offences, a maximum fine of $2000.00 or imprisonment for up to one year, or 
both. C argued that these options for simple possession were unconstitutional.  
A second appellant, M, describe himself as a “marijuana/freedom activist”, and assisted 
in the operations of the organization “Harm Reduction Club” which was a co-operative, non-for-
profit association seeking to reduce harm associated with the use of marijuana. Police entered the 
club and seized over 300 grams of marijuana. M was charged under section 4(2) of the Narcotics 
Control Act for possession for the purpose of trafficking. M appealed this charge on the grounds 
that the charge was unconstitutional. The trial judge did not allow this constitutional argument, 
and the conviction was upheld. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The Court approaches 
the issue surrounding the law, not of the policy due to its sound intention and objective. The 
appellants argued that the legislation infringed upon the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the 
Court responded by agreeing the inclusion of an imprisonment option triggers a section 7 
violation, however M’s desire to build a lifestyle surrounding recreational use of marijuana does 
not constitute a section 7 violation.   
The Court evaluated the law with consideration of section 7, concluding that if a law was 
arbitrary or irrational it would constitute a section 7 violation. However, the law’s intention of 
avoiding harm to citizens is neither arbitrary nor irrational. The Court’s evaluation of arbitrary 
within this case resulted in denying the appeal on the grounds the law did not constitute a section 
7 violation. The principle was examined on the grounds of harm to the public – the law’s 
intention directly related to the best interest and protection of the general public as opposed to 
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the individual’s freedom. The Court agreed that the intention was rational and the law’s means of 
reaching it was rationally connected. The Court addressed the availability of the imprisonment 
option for possession of marijuana through examination of previous cases under the same 
section. The Court found that in majority of cases where simple possession is the issue of law, 
the imprisonment option is used with strong discretion. The Narcotics Control Act is a 
framework for dealing with all drug offences – not specifically marijuana – and therefore was 
reasonable in including imprisonment as an option for drugs to better address aggravating 
factors, amounts and types of drugs. The claim of arbitrariness was unsuccessfully used in this 
case, creating a furthered definition of what arbitrary is not. Majority of cases do not have a 
successful arbitrary challenge due to the high standard, specific reasoning for its use, and the 
respect for the dialogue with parliament.  
Limits on the Claim of Arbitrariness.   
Due to the ‘insulting’22 nature of it use, arbitrary claims are not often made by the Court.  
In Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General)23 the dissenting opinion argued to allow 
Rodriguez’s appeal for physician assisted suicide on the grounds that the law preventing this 
procedure was arbitrary. The three dissenting Justices found that the intention of protecting 
vulnerable individuals was arbitrary as the law was hindering the vulnerable directly. Those in 
pursuit of physician-assisted suicide would be those who could not commit suicide on their own, 
and there was no prohibition preventing suicide without assistance. The majority opinion did not 
                                                
22The Supreme Court of Canada has a well balanced dialogue with Canadian Parliament. When the Court 
reject legislation on the grounds that the “law bears no relation to its intention”, it can be considered 
insulting to law makers within parliament. This is an undesired strain on this important dialogue.   
 
23	Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 SCR 519	
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allow the appeal as it was found that that intention of protecting the vulnerable was upheld by the 
law as it protected individuals from a “moment of weakness in committing suicide.”  Arbitrary 
was not successfully used in Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General)24 (Stewart, 2012). 
VII. Moral Blameworthiness  
Moral Blameworthiness is a relatively unexplored principle under section 7 of the 
Charter. The basic understanding of this principle is the protection of individuals from being 
criminally charged for a civil wrongdoing. Moral blameworthiness was best explored by the 
Court in Re. B.C. Motor Vehicle Act25. This reference case evaluated the legitimacy of section 
92(2) of the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, which provided minimum periods of incarceration for 
diving without a valid driver’s license, regardless of the driver’s knowledge of the prohibition or 
suspension. The Court found that this violated section 7 of the Charter, specifically evoking the 
principles of fundamental justice. The principle of ‘moral blameworthiness’ is not explicitly 
defined within this case and therefore does not have a ‘test’ associated with its use. All absolute 
liability charges have the potential of offending section 7, however the lack of knowledge of the 
committing the offence (i.e. driving without a valid driver’s license), offends section 7 past the 
point of being justifiable in a free and democratic society. The Courts took the opportunity of 
further define what the principles of fundamental justice are under section 7, as the Charter had 
only been enacted for 3 years at the time of this reference case. The Court provide a more in 
depth discussion of moral blameworthiness within R v Ruzic26. The Court also linked the 
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25 Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486 
 
26R v Ruzic [2001] 1 SCR 687   
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principle of moral blameworthiness to “moral voluntariness”. Moral voluntariness is a criminal 
element which liability is related to mens rea and actus reus and the individual’s quality of 
voluntariness in committing the action in question. Voluntariness is associated with the person’s 
knowing of committing the action and then willing it to be done. The lower court is discussed 
both moral blameworthiness and moral voluntariness as equated terms.  
The Court did not agree with this approach. Instead, moral blameworthiness was removed 
from being an element of criminal liability, but a factor in establishing section 7 violations. 
Moral voluntariness is established as a criminal element when mens rea and actus reus are 
absent and duress is established. The Court acknowledge the ambiguousness of the principle and 
the lack of definition surrounding its use but did not add any additional formal definitions. Moral 
blameworthiness is most used in regards to absolute liability charges, and within Ruzic, in 
regards to moral involuntariness and duress in committing a criminal action. The Court did not 
further its use from substantive elements of criminal charges and these violating section 7. The 
Court did provide moral blameworthiness as a larger, overarching term that extends beyond the 
boundaries of traditional elements of an offence. The principle cannot be evoked as a defense to 
a criminal action, but as a secondary standard for a criminal action offending section 7.  
R v Vaillancourt [1987] 2 SCR 636 
R v Vaillancourt27 discusses the validity of the former section 213 of the Criminal Code 
as it relates to section 7 and 11 of the Charter. Section 213 read that "culpable homicide is murder 
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where a person causes the death of a human being while committing or attempting to commit ... 
robbery ... whether or not the person means to cause death to any human being and whether or not 
he knows that death is likely to be caused to any human being, if ... he uses a weapon or has it upon 
his person during or at the time he commits or attempts to commit the offence ... and the death 
ensues as a consequence" (R v Vaillancourt, 1987, para. 3).   
The majority of the Supreme Court found that section 213 violates section 7 and section 11 
of the Charter and should be of no force or effect. The element within section 213 that combines the 
action of robbery with a homicide charge violates an individual’s right to life, liberty and security as 
well as their right to presumption of innocence. This combination removes the element of mens rea 
that is attached to homicide while removing the standard of proof for homicide, which is beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The Court held that intention of the original action (armed robbery) does not hold 
a high enough standard to constitute a homicide charge automatically. The Court rejected section 
213’s statement that an individual’s likeliness of foreseeability of death from an armed robbery be 
proof enough to automatically constitute homicide. Juries could easily have conflicting views on 
what establishing foreseeability in different circumstances, effecting section 213’s constitutional 
validity.  
Moral blameworthiness is applied by the Court through stating that Parliament’s 
responsibilities to create and enforce law are subject to abiding by the principles of fundamental 
justice. The Court continue to discuss that any law that has absolute liability is subject to moral 
blameworthiness as it creates an automatic and substantive restriction of life, liberty and security of 
person. The Court found that the lack of mental state that must be proven within mens rea is not 
within section 213 parameters and is inconsistent with moral blameworthiness, as an individual’s 
intention could be far from causing harm to the point of death. Moral blameworthiness seeks to 
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prohibit punishing the “morally innocent” as it creates a prohibition on connecting original intention 
with an unforeseen outcome. The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered while declaring 
section 213 of no force or effect.  
R v Creighton [1993] 3 SCR 3 
The issue of law being discussed within R v Creighton28 is the constitutional validity of 
section 222(5) of the Criminal Code. Section 222(5) establishes that culpable homicide is 
committed when a person causes the death of another person by means of an unlawful act, 
criminal negligence, threats or willfully frightening them. Creighton, along with the victim and a 
companion, were ingesting large quantities of alcohol and cocaine within the deceased’s 
apartment. The deceased was killed by an injection into her arm, which caused cardiac arrest and 
severe convulsions. The accused placed the victim on the bed and was convinced by the 
companion to not call the police and to wipe the evidence away of their actions. Several hours 
later, after leaving the victims apartment, the accused called the police. Creighton was charged 
under section 222(5) of the criminal code, and the distribution of drugs to the victim was 
considered trafficking drugs under the Narcotics Control Act. The accused presented that the 
definition of manslaughter under section 222(5) violates section 7 of the Charter. The Court 
dismissed the appeal. The Court evaluated the test of mens rea associated with unlawful act 
manslaughter, which states that an objective foreseeability of risk of bodily harm must not be 
trivial or transitory if that action is dangerous in nature. The Court found that this test does not 
violate any of the principles of fundamental justice.  
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The punishment attached to this charge does not require an elevated degree of mens rea 
due to the act of ‘killing’ as opposed to ‘murder’. The Court also established that the charges 
distinction between ‘bodily harm’ and ‘manslaughter’ disappears when the victim is killed, 
regardless of the nature of the death. It was stated that this does not violate any principles of 
fundamental justice as well.  
The Court defined the principle of moral blameworthiness in two areas. Firstly, the 
majority discusses that moral blameworthiness does not require absolute symmetry between the 
moral fault and the prohibited consequence. This discussion is aimed at protecting Parliament’s 
ability to secure reasonable punishments for actions, regardless of it being considered a moral 
fault.  
Secondly, moral blameworthiness is discussed is La Forest J’s concurrent decision, as mens 
rea is presented as a similar principle to moral blameworthiness. This distinction is in the 
wording that mens rea is subject to the mental state regarding the action, which in turn would 
protect the morally innocent, whereas moral blameworthiness is discussed as being morally 
innocent in totality. The Court concluded that manslaughter and section 222(5) of the Criminal 
Code satisfy the principles of fundamental justice. 
VIII. Gross Disproportionality 
The principle of Gross Disproportionality applies to the reach of the law’s impact on the 
person claiming a section 7 violations. Gross disproportionality seeks to ensure that the effect of 
the law is proportionate to the objective of the law (Stewart, 2012, pg. 149). The Court will 
evaluate if the beneficial impacts of the law outweigh the negative impacts on the individual. 
This evaluation is not strict; the Court must only prove that effect of the law is grossly 
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disproportionate to its beneficial effects (Stewart, 2012, pg.149). Gross disproportionality does 
have a Supreme Court test for establishing a violation. The test is to determine if the state action 
or law is “so extreme” that it is “disproportionate to any legitimate government interest” as found 
within Suresh v Canada29. The test also establishes that gross disproportionality must exists and 
not mere or overbreadth disproportionality. The difference in establishing gross 
disproportionality is a significant change in expectation and reach of the delirious effects. The 
Court allows for “broad latitude” with legislation. Thus makes establishing this test a difficult 
task. The standard for gross disproportionality is to such a high extent that proving the legislation 
to be grossly disproportionate is very difficult. Stewart (2012) states that “it is difficult for a 
Charter application to demonstrate that a law fails to comply with this standard, so it is 
unsurprising that the Supreme Court has never invalided a law or expressly set aside a decision 
on this ground” (Stewart, 2012, pg. 149). The Court has come forward in several cases validating 
the appellants’ plea of gross disproportionality and explicitly stated that the law is in violation of 
the principle of gross disproportionality. In the Bedford30 decision, the Court explicitly states that 
the law is in violation of the principle of gross disproportionality due to the objectives delirious 
effects on individuals safety and the individual interest and right to life, liberty and security of 
person.  
 The concept of disproportionality is seen within several areas of judicial ruling, including 
in the Oakes Test31. The third prong of the Oakes Test is Proportionality, which states that the 
delirious effects of the law must not outweigh the benefits it provides to society. This area of the 
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30 See Note 31  
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Oakes Test is similar in intent as to gross disproportionality. The Court has established that the 
section 1 evaluation is different than the principle of fundamental justice; however, they have a 
significant amount of overlap. Within Malmo-Levine 32 it was established that it was 
inappropriate under the rule of law to import the ideals of the section 1 evaluation into the 
principles of fundamental justice (Stewart, 2012).  Both of these evaluations seek to balance the 
positive effects of the law against the negative effects onto the individual. However, gross 
disproportionality under the principles of fundamental justice have a higher threshold for proving 
the violation.   
R v Smith, [1987], SCR 1045  
 The issue of law discussed within R v Smith33 regards the constitutionality of section 5(2) 
of the former Narcotics Control Act. The appellant was charged for importing seven and a half 
ounces of cocaine into Canada. This action invokes section 5(2) that contains the seven-year 
mandatory minimum sentence of incarceration. The Court stated that a mandatory minimum 
sentence does not automatically invoke section 12 or an infringement on any Charter right; 
however, the lack of alternatives available to the courts along with the lack of consideration of 
severity, personal characteristics of the offender, and circumstantial issues within the individual 
offence create a possibility of infringing section 12. The Court found that the retributive 
measures of the minimum sentence, along with inevitable incarceration upon a guilt offence 
violate section 12 on its face and cannot be saved under section 1. 
                                                
32 R v Malmo-Levine, R v Caine [2003] 3 SCR 571 
33	R v Smith, [1987], SCR 1045  
	
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF PRINCIPLES OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE 38	
R v Smith puts forward a successful use of gross disproportionality, but does not invoke 
section 7. The appellant challenged if the mandatory minimum attached to the charged violated 
section 7, 9 and 12 of the Charter.  The Court found that the mandatory minimum did violated 
section 12 under cruel and unusual punishment and could not be saved under section 1. The 
Court identified that the issue being examined is that of gross disproportionality, due to the aim 
of punishment beyond that of mere punishment. Section 5(2) was declared no force or effect. 
Upon analysis of the section 1 evaluation, the Court found that the proportionality prong was 
offended immediately. The purpose of the minimum sentence of deterring the importation of 
narcotics into Canada is an important and substantial objective, however, seven years of 
incarceration for minor or first-time offenders is not proportionate to the offence and unneeded to 
deter serious offenders.  
 The Court uses both the principle of gross disproportionality and arbitrariness to define 
the nature of the minimum sentence attached to section 5(2) of the act. Gross disproportionality 
is found in several areas of Charter law including the Oakes Test, principles of fundamental 
justice and as a standard for section 12 violations (Stewart, 2012, pg. 149, note 137). Justice 
Wilson J states that the minimum sentence under section 5(2) of the Narcotics Control Act is 
grossly disproportionate and meets the high standard of the test to be “so excessive as to outrage 
standards of decency” (R v Smith, 1987).  The three concurrent opinions presented by Wilson, Le 
Dain and La Forest all support the use of arbitrariness and disproportionality as a violation to 
section 12.  
Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society [2011], SCR 134  
 The constitutionality of safe injection sites was questioned under section 56 of the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA). Section 56 grants the federal Minister of Health 
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the authority to allow or disallow exemptions regarding drugs and other substances for scientific 
needs or societal interests. Drug use and drug related disease reached a crisis level in Vancouver 
in the early 1990’s. As a response to this crisis, safe injection sites were established in the 
downtown eastside of Vancouver as experimental solutions to the spread of disease and illness 
associated with the injection of drugs. The experiment was found to be successful in reducing 
disease and drug related death from users of the safe injection site.  
In 2008 a formal application was made by the site for a continued exemption to stay 
open, the federal Minister of Health, under section 56 of the CDSA, denied this exception. The 
denied exemption was brought before the courts. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and 
ordered the minister of health to grant the exemption under section 56.  
The Court found that the disallowance of safe injection sites was a violation of section 7 
for those who used the site. It was found that life, liberty and security of person were inherently 
invoked for the clients of the site. It was affirmed that section 7 protected their ability to have 
drugs and controlled substances within the grounds of the site, despite the CDSA prohibition.  
Section 56 gives discretion to the Minister to make decisions such as this. However, the Court 
state that this discretion is, as all laws are, subject to the Charter and must be within the scope of 
the Charter. The interests of society to have safe injection sites invoke section 7 and the 
disallowance under the discretion of the federal Minister of Health violates it. The Court 
mentions the principles of fundamental justice several times within their discussion of the 
constitutionality of safe injection sites, offering that not allowing them would offend gross 
disproportionality, arbitrariness and overbreadth.  
The Court primarily focused on the violation of gross disproportionality states that 
“…this Court found that the Minister’s refusal to exempt the safe injection site from drug 
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possession laws was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice because the 
effect of denying health services and increasing the risk of death and disease of injection drug 
users was grossly disproportionate to the objectives of the drug possession laws, namely public 
health and safety.” (Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011). This 
statement adds definition to the principle, as it now includes death and disease while also 
limiting federal power. The Court’s decision creates added importance and definition to the 
principle of gross disproportionality.  
Bedford v Canada (Attorney General), [2013] SCR 1101  
 Bedford v. Canada34 discuss the constitutionality of three section of the 2013 Criminal 
Code of Canada: section 210, 212(1) and 213(1). Section 210 prohibited being keep or being 
within a “bawdy-house”, 212(1) made living on the avails of prostitution an offence, and section 
213(1) prohibited public communication regarding prostitution. The appellants argued that these 
sections are a violation of section 7 of the Charter due to the limits on life, liberty and security of 
person from being denied the ability to hire security guards or introduce a “screening process” 
for clients. At the Supreme Court level, all three provisions were found to be inconsistent with 
section 7 and could not be saved by section 1. The Court identified that the provisions were 
blatantly restrictive on life, liberty and security of person and inconsistent with the principles of 
fundamental justice.  
                                                
34	Bedford v Canada (Attorney General), [2013] SCR 1101  
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The Court engages three principles in their discussion of the violation: arbitrariness, 
overbreadth and gross disproportionality. The objectives of each section of the Criminal Code 
were examined to determine which principle is engaged. Section 212 systematically targets the 
‘pimps’ and their exploitative behaviors in attempt to earn income from the avails of prostitution. 
However, the law does not punish these individuals, but holds everyone who live off the income 
earned responsible. This could include those who are attempting to reduce danger such as 
legitimate bodyguards, drivers, and/or receptionists. This law was arbitrary in its attempt to 
increase safety of the individual and target the ‘pimps’.  
Section 213(1) restricted the public communication of prostitution with the objective of 
eliminating the nuisance of street prostitution, moving these conversations to private locations. 
The negative effects on the individual, which include increased danger, lack of screening, 
heightening issues due to intoxication, is gross disproportionate to the benefit of removing a 
nuisance to the general public.  
Section 210 also sought to remove the nuisance of prostitution from the general public, 
but significantly increased the danger the individual could encounter making it grossly 
disproportionate. The benefit of having prostitution behind closed doors, while limiting the 
individual’s ability to work from a fixed location to access a safe location is grossly 
disproportionate in objective and in practice.  
 Bedford v Canada provides an in-depth and fairly comprehensive definition of the 
principle of fundamental justice under section 3(a)(b) beginning in paragraph 93 of the decision. 
The Court put forward obvious definitions as to what qualifies as a principle and their use: “The 
principles of fundamental justice set out the minimum requirements that a law that negatively 
impacts on a person’s life, liberty, or security of the person must meet.  As Lamer J. put it, “[t]he 
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term ‘principles of fundamental justice’ is not a right, but a qualifier of the right not to be 
deprived of life, liberty and security of the person; its function is to set the parameters of that 
right” (Bedford v Canada (Attorney General) [2013] SCR 1101, para. 94). Within Bedford v 
Canada the Court specifically acknowledge and accept the claim of gross disproportionality for 
section’s 210 and 213(1) of the Criminal Code. This decision had broadly significant impacts on 
society. The laws were suspended for a one-year duration and faced reevaluation from 
Parliament by removing criminality from the actions of prostitutes and those living off its 
earning plus changing to applying criminality to only those who purchase prostitutions. It also 
provides one of the most comprehensive definitions of the principles of fundamental justice and 
how they can be applied. The Court also provide a strong definition of the individual principle of 
gross disproportionality:  
“…laws are also in violation of our basic values when the effect of the law is grossly 
disproportionate to the state’s objective.  In Malmo-Levine, the accused challenged the 
prohibition on the possession of marijuana on the basis that its effects were grossly 
disproportionate to its objective.  Although the Court agreed that a law with grossly 
disproportionate effects would violate our basic norms, the Court found that this was not 
such a case: “. . . the effects on accused persons of the present law, including the potential 
of imprisonment, fall within the broad latitude within which the Constitution permits 
legislative action” (Bedford v Canada, 2015, para. 175).  
This inclusion set a strong precedent for future section 7 cases. 
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Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2015] 1 SCR 331  
 Carter v Canada35 contested the former section 241 of the Criminal Code, which 
prohibited anyone from assisting or abetting another person in committing suicide. Section 14 
was also challenged in this ruling as it restricts a person from consenting to death. Taken 
together, these two provisions made it an indictable offence to engage in physician-assisted 
dying. The appellants challenged the provision preventing physician-assisted death after the 
diagnoses of a fatal neurodegenerative disease.  
The Court found that the prevention of access to this physician-assisted dying to a 
suffering, competent adult was a violation of section 7 and could not be saved under section 1. 
The Court rendered sections 241 and 14 of no force or effect and allowed physician-assisted 
dying under two circumstances: it will be allowed for competent adult who “… (1) clearly 
consents to the termination of life and (2) has a grievous and irremediable medical condition 
(including an illness, disease or disability) that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the 
individual in the circumstances of his or her condition.” (Carter v Canada, 2015). The Court 
identified that the principle of gross disproportionality is engaged, as well as arbitrariness and 
overbreadth. The impugned legislation was found to violate all three principles.  
The test for gross disproportionality was put against the objectives of the legislative and 
was found that the intention of legislation deprived individuals of their right to life, liberty and 
security of person to an extent that was beyond that of ‘mere’ or ‘overbreadth’. The objective to 
protect vulnerable individuals from momentary weakness that results in the ending of their life is 
highly important for the interest of the individual, their families and society as a whole. 
                                                
35 Carter v Canada [2015] 1 SCR 331  
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However, the law does not provide protection of vulnerable individuals, it instead prolongs 
suffering and may result in individuals ending their lives sooner and on less humane methods. 
The objective is greatly disproportionate to the delirious effects it has on the individual, meeting 
the standard for gross disproportionality.  
 The Carter decision revised it’s own precedent case, Rodriguez v British Columbia 
(Attorney General).36 This change of precedent from rejecting a section 7 violation, to accepting 
it over a 22 year period represents an important modification in the Court’s interpretation of 
section 7. The Carter v Canada decision set an important precedent for the use of gross 
disproportionality by increasing its understanding within the Canadian legal system. 
IX. Limitations of the Principles of Fundamental Justice 
There are many critiques regarding the use of the principle of fundamental justice.  Some 
authors, including Hogg (1997), see other areas of law such as the common law system as the 
basic tenets of the legal system and not the principles of fundamental justice. The central and 
most dominate definition of these principle are their role as the “basic tenets of the legal system.” 
This sweeping definition is critiqued by Hogg as concepts such as the “common law system” are 
much more likely to be the basic tenets. The over-stated importance of these principles combined 
with their lack of definition only increases confusion regarding their use, according to Hogg 
(1997).  
Other limitations on the principles of fundamental just include the significant overlap 
throughout the principles of overbreadth, arbitrariness and disproportionality as they offer a 
                                                
36 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General) [1993] 3 SCR 519 
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redundancy within section 7. These three principle offer some what identical evaluations of law 
and could easily be mended into one over-arching principle. The definitions offer the same 
remedy, but stated differently: “… a law that bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with its 
original intention...”, “…legislation must not be overly broad in its relation to its intended 
purpose…”, and, “…effect of the law is proportionate to the objective of the law.” The purpose 
of the principles of overbreadth, arbitrariness and disproportionality is to correct the failures of 
instrumental rationality; each principle address laws that failed at meeting a norm, creating a 
mismatch between the objective and the means (Stewart, 2012, pg. 151). Stewart (2012) explains 
that the substantive purpose of the principles is similar, but address different aspects of 
legislative failure. Stewart states that the Court may keep them as separate principles for the 
purpose of addressing failures that are not identical; a law can be overbroad without being 
arbitrary, for example (Stewart, 2012, pg. 151). These three definitions could be compressed into 
one over arching principle, as they all have the same substantive meanings. Stewart suggests that 
keeping the principles as three distinct principles offers the most benefit due to already being 
applied in precedent cases (Stewart, 2012, 154). Stewart (2012) suggests that by combining the 
principles a violation would have to offend all three aspects and meet all three tests in order for 
an infringement to exist. Counter to this thought, by creating a principle that encompasses all 
three elements without making it a requirement to meet the standard of all three could broaden 
the Court’s ability.  
Another limitation of these principles is the overlap in evaluation from the section 1 test 
or Oakes Test. The primarily overlap is within gross disproportionality. The third prong of the 
Oakes evaluation is the test for proportionality, which could be argued to mimic the standard, 
wording and test of gross disproportionality. The limitation of this is that when a section 7 
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violation is presented, the Court automatically run through the section 1 test to determine if the 
violation is justified. If is does not pass the section 1 test, the violation is found to not be justified 
in a free and democratic society, which would then trigger the evaluation of the principles of 
fundamental justice. This means that every law that infringes section 7 must have failed the 
proportionality test in order to invoke the principles of fundamental justice, meaning all of them 
would violate gross disproportionality. 
X. Conclusion 
The conclusion of this study is that the Supreme Court of Canada is reluctant to provide a 
cohesive and concurrent understanding of each principle for the purpose of keeping them 
unconstricted. This type of conclusion regarding the principles of fundamental justice can result 
in confusion regarding the nature of the principles, overlap in definitions and wide differences 
regarding use from case to case.  
The implications of this research is to better examine the Court’s interpretation of these 
principles. It could be concluded that the principles of fundamental justice are not easily 
understood within the Canadian legal system purposely. The Court has decided to refrain from 
restricting themselves on defining them precisely for the purpose of better protecting and 
accommodating individuals right to life, liberty and security of person. The benefit of this lack of 
definition is the Court’s ability to use them in a wide range of areas and continue accessing them 
for new reasons. The fall back of this method is the lack of knowledge from the Court to society 
regarding what the Court has stated to be the “basic tenets of the legal system.”  
The substantive principles were not an original inclusion from the framers of the Charter, 
but were later added by the Court to better protect life, liberty and security of person. This 
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change of interpretation is consistent with trends seen within the Supreme Court, including that 
of judicial activism for the purpose of social and economic benefit for the community (Hogg, 
1997, pg. 105). The major trend between each substantive principle of fundamental justice is the 
openness in definition for the purpose of being able to better protect the individual from injustice 
laws. Each principle is able to target laws in different areas to address section 7 violations, and 
the laws attached to those violations.  
In the future, it can be predicted that the Courts will eventually add to the definitions to 
make them cohesive, but due to the relative newness of the Charter, the open interpretation 
provide more benefit then it does drawback. The Charter has only been enumerated within 
Canadian society for 37 years, making it relatively new within our legal system. There is 
significant room for growth for each of these principles and possible inclusion of others in the 
future. An area that could be potentially added to the principles of fundamental justice is the 
principle of minimal impairment. Proportionality is seen in several areas in law including the 
Oakes Test. A consideration from the Court could be to take from the Oakes evaluation and 
include minimal impairment under the substantive principles as well. This concept states that the 
state must take the least impairing means of reaching their goal. This follows the trend of the 
current substantive principles, within the same trend and objective as several of the other 
principles. The issues of repetition within these principles and other areas of law is concerning. 
However, if the Court continues this repetition it could provide a strong ‘back-bone’ to each of 
these concepts and strength the Court’s ability to use them in other areas.  
Although these principles are not easily understood and offer a variety of limitations, 
their use within the Supreme Court have had important and far reaching positive effects on 
Canadian society. Presenting a secondary standard for section 7 evaluations has given the right to 
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life, liberty and security of person increased ‘teeth’ within Parliament, resulting in laws being 
struck down or read out for societal and individual benefit. The limitations of the principles of 
fundamental justice do not outweigh their importance and positive effects for Canadian law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF PRINCIPLES OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE 49	
XI. References 
Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford [2013] 3 SCR 1101  
Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society [2011] SCR 134 
Carter v Canada [2015] 1 SCR 331 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
 Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.  
Cornell Law School (2019) Legal Information Institute: Civil Procedure. [online] Retrieved 
 February 18, 2019 form https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/civil_procedure.  
Code of Canada, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 318(1)   
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 
Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] SCR 1101 
Evans, M, J. (1991). The principles of fundamental justice: The Constitution and the common 
 law. Osgoode Hall Law Journal. 29 (1) 51-92.  
Hogg, W, P. (1997). The Charter dialogue between courts and legislature (or perhaps the 
Charter of Rights isn’t such a bad thing after all). Osgoode Hall Law Journal. 35(1) 75-
124.  
Hogg, W, P. (2012). The brilliant career of Section 7 of the Charter. The Supreme Court Law 
 Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference. 58 (7) 195-210.  
O’Neill v Canada (Attorney General) [2006] 213 CCC (3d) 389 (Ont SCJ) [O’Neill] 
Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 SCR 519 
R v Clay [2003] 3 SCR 735 
R v Demers [2004] 2 SCR 489, 2004 SCC 46 
R. v. Heywood [1994] 3 SCR 761 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF PRINCIPLES OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE 50	
R. v. Khawaja [2012] SCC 69, 3 S.C.R. 555  
R v. Malmo-Levine, R v. Caine [2003] 3 SCR 571 
R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30 
R v Morlas [1992] 3 SCR 711 
R v Motor Vehicle Act [1985] 2 SCR 486 
R v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society [1992] 2 SCR 606.  
R v. Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103  
R v Ruzic [2001] 1 SCR 687   
R v. Smith, [1987], SCR 1045  
R v. Vaillancourt [1987] 2 SCR 636 
Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1 
Sharpe, J, R., Roach, K. (2017) The Charter of Rights and Freedoms (6th ed) Toronto: Canada.  
 Irwin Law Inc.  
Stewart, H. (2012). Fundamental justice: Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and  
 Freedoms. Toronto: Canada. Irwin Law Inc.  
University of Southern California (2019) Organizing your social sciences research paper: 
Types of research design. USC Libraries. Retrieved March 18, 2019 from 
http://libguides.usc.edu/writingguide/researchdesigns  
 
 
 
